Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1971

Ronald Bradshaw, Et Al v. Beaver City, A Municipal Corporation, Et
Al. : Brief of Respondents

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.W. Robert Wright and Sam Cline; Attorneys for Respondents
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Bradshaw v. Beaver City, No. 12524 (1971).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/5446

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

r

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RONALD BRADSHAW, et al,
Plaintiffs and Appella.1118,
vs.

BEAVER CITY, a Municipal
Corporation, et al,

Cue No.
JUI•

Defendants and Reaponilmts.

lI
,t

BRIBF OF RESPONDENTS
Appeal from Judpumt of the Flftll Dlltrllt C-*
in and for B•ver COllllQ",
Honorable J. Harlan Bu.ru, Dl8tnll llille

JONES, WALDO, ROLUOOS

& McDONOUGH
W. Robert Wrilht
800 Walker Bak

-

ROBERT.S. CAMPBELL, JR.
STEWART M. HANSON, JR.
400 El Paso Ga1 Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

and Appellants

.
Salt Lake
Utall
,
CLINE, JACKS01' ls JA<.m
SamCllne
Milford, Utah

F
········

AUG5 -1971

.... c..t, U1J;

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATE.MENT OF THE :NATURE OF
TIIE CASE ------·------------------------------·-·····--··········l
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT ········-·-··· 2

RELIEF SOUGIIT ON APPEAL ··········--·····-··2
S'l'ATEl\lEXT
FACTS ·-······-··········-······-·····
2
ARG Ul\IENT --····-·-···--------------------·--·-------·---······-······
3
POINT I. SUl\ll\IARY JUDGMENT IS
PROPER 'VHEN Tl-IERE IS XO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT, THE
DETERMINATION OF 'VI-II CI-I IS NECESSARY TO SETTLE THE RIGHTS OF THE
P AHTIES. ---·-···········--------------------------·····················-··
3
POINT II. THE APPELLANT HAS NO
LEGAL BASIS FOR RELIEF. ---·--···-·······--··-····8
A. TIIE CITY OF BEA YER PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS LEGISLATIYE
PQ,,TER. ··-·------···--········-········································-·
8
R. l\IUNICIP ALITIES HA VE THE
RIGHT TO RECONSIDER ACT I 0 N
1'r\KEN. ····----·-···-······-····-----················-···················
13
C. ANNEXATION OF THE PROPERTY
IN QUESTION BY THE CITY OF BEAYER 'VOULD BE LEGALLY JUSTI1<' l l!:D. ..... __ ...... -··············-···-························-············
15
1

Page

POINT III. Tl-IE PLAINTIFF POSES A
SERIOUS CHALLEXGE TO TJIE PO,VER
GRANTED TO MUNICIPALITIES BY
THE UTAH LEGISLATURE. ·········-·-----···-····-17
CON CL USI ON ·--·-·--··--·-------·--··-------·-··········-----·-------19

CONSTITUTIONAL SECTIONS CITED

Utah Constitution, Art. V, §1 ---·-··-·····-·-·-··················
9

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Ann.,

§

10-3-1 (1962) ................ 1, 8, 9, IO

Utah Code Ann., §§ 10-4-1-10-4-5 ( 1962) ............ 9, IO
Utah Code Ann., § 10-6-5 ( 1962) ·····------··--·-·······
10, H
Utah Code Ann., § 10-7-1 ( 1962) ----------··--···--·······--13

RULE CITED
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 ( c) __ 2, 3, 18, 19

CASES CITED

Abdulkadir v. 'Vestern Pacific R.R. Co.,
5, 7
7 U.2d 53, 318 P.2d 339 (1957) ·····--·············
Aetna Loan Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of
Maryland, 9 U.2d 412, 346 P.2d 1078
5, 6, 7
( 1959) -························--·······························
11

Allen':, Produds Co. v. Glover, 18 U.2d 106,
417

Page

121 (1966) -----·--·······-··-·····················
4, 7

Amundson v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident
r\.ss'n., 13 U.2d 407, 375 P.2d 463 (1962) .... 4, 7
,\ ndrns v. Allred, 17 U.2d lOu, 404 P.2d 972
( 1965) ·····-···-···-·----··-·-··---·······································
10
Application of Peterson, 92 U.212, 66 P.2d 1195
( 1937) ·----·--··-···························-·················-···········
9
l3randt v. Springville Banking Co., 10 U.2d 350,
353 P.2d 460 (19u0) ........................................ 4, 7
Christensen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 U.2d 194,
443 P.2d 385 (1968) ····---·····--···-···········-··········
4, 6
City of Ilarvey v. Getz., 118 F.2d 817, (7th Cir.),
cert. den. 314 U.S. 628, 86 L.Ed. 504,
62 S.Ct. 59 (1941) --············································
14
Cowlitz County v. Johnson, 2 '"ash. 2d 497,
98 P.2d 644 ( 1940) --··-·······································
14
Crawford v. Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 59 So. 963
( 1912) ········································-·········-······-··
13, 15
Dal .Maso v. Bd. of Comm' rs of Prince George's
Countv, 182 :Md. 200, 34 A.2d 464 ( 1943) ........ 14
Dowse v. Salt Lake City Corp., 123 U. 107,
255 P.2d 723 (1953) ··············-················
.. ··· 16, 17
Dupler v. Yates, 10 U.2d 251, 351 P.2d 624
(1960) ·············-············································
4, 6, 7
ELhrnrds Realty & Finance Co. v. City of Superior,
2:30 'Vis. 472, 27 N.,V.2d 370 ............................ 14
Foster v. Steed, 19 U.2d 435, 432 P.2d 60
( 1967) -·······························································
4, 6
111

Page
Henry v. lVashiki Club Inc., 11 U.2d 138,
355 P.2d 973 (1960) ........................................ 4, 7

In re Town of 'Vest Jordan, 7 U.2d 391, 326 P.2d
105 (1958) ···················································
u
Lehi City v. :.Meiling, 87 U.237, 48 P.2d 530
(1935) ··························································
13, 18
Leininger v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 17 U.2d 37,
404 P.2d 33 (1965) .................................... 4, 6, 7
v. Salt Lake County, 18 U.2d 203,
418 P.2d 227 ( 1966) ................................ 4, 6, 18

v. Cox, 24 U.2d 43, 465 P.2d 530
(1970) ··························································
4, 6
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124, 24 L.Ed. 77
( 1876) .................................................................... 14
N at'l American Life Ins. Co. v. Bayou Country
Club, H1 C.:2d 417, 403 P.2d 26 ( 1965) ........ 4, 7
Peay v. Bd. of of Ed. of Provo City School Dist.,
14 U.2d 63, 377 P.2d 490 (1962) .................... IO
Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt Lake City,
116 U. 536, 212 P.2d 177 (1949) .................... 16
Pioneer Finance & Thrift Co. v. Powell, 21 P.2d 201,
443 P.2d 389 (1968) ................................ 4, 6, 7
Pioneer Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Pioneer Finance
& Thrift Co., 18 U.2d 106, 417 P.2d 121
(1966) :............................................................... 4, 7
Plutus
Co. v. Orme, 76 U. 286, 289 P. 132
(1930) ··························································
g

Richards v. Anderson, 9 U.2d 17, 337 P.2d 59
( 1959) ··························································
5, 7
IV

Hing"oocl '" State, 8 C.:Ld 287, 3i33 P.2d H43

Page

( 1\15\J) -------- --- ------- ------------ --- -- ------ ---- -·-----------. -· ·--·--- 1()

Holiillson

Y.

Sjostrom

Y.

Employers' Liability . Assurance

Corp., 22 U.2<l 163, 450 P.2d 91 ( 1969) ________ 4, 6

Bishop, 15 U.2d 37a, 393 P.2d 472

( 1964) -------------------------------·····--------------------------··---- 10

State '· .Jones, 17 U.2d 190, 407 P.2d 571

(

----------------··--····-------·····------····-····--·-·-····--·--··
10

Y. IIolm, 24 U.2d 190, 468 P.2d 366
(l\170) ................................................................ 4, 6

Summerhays

Transamerica Title Ins. Co. Y. United Resources,
Lnc., 24 U.2d 346, 471 P.2d 165 ( 1970) .... 4, 5, 7
Tygesen '" Magna ·vvater Co., 119 U. 27 4,
226 P.2d 127 (1950) .................................... 13, 16
Young '" Felornia, 121 U. 64(), 244 P.2<l 862
( 1U52) ---·--------·------··--····-------------------------------------5, 6
Young

Y.

S:ilt Lake City, 24 U.321, 67 P. 106()

(I U02) ---------------------------------·--------------------------·-------

v

9

IN THE SUPREME COURT
THE STArIE OF UTAH
( ) {1'

UONALD BRADSHA\V, et al,
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Case No.

vs.
BEA
CITY, a l\;lunicipal
Corporation, et al,
Defendants and Respondents.

12524

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATE:\IENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is a suit brought by Plaintiff to enjoin the
exercise by Beaver City of its lawful power over its corporate limits as provided by Section 10-3-1, Utah Code
.\ 11nota ted ( 1962), which delegates to the cities and
l(mus in the State of Utah the power of annexation.
1

DISPOSITION IX THE LO\VER COURT
Upon nlotions by the Defendants for Summary
Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 ( c) , U tab Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Trial Court found that, even were the
Plaintiff's allegations determined to be true, the De.
fendants' acts complained of did not constitute a ground
upon which Plaintiff was entitled to relief. The De.
fendants being entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
Summary Judgment in their favor was granted.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Defendants-Respondents seek aff irmance of
the judgment of the Trial Court.

STATEnIENT OF FACTS
1. In response to an inquiry by Defendant, Inter-

state Development Company, regarding the annexation
of certain property, the City Council of the City of
Beaver announced its judgment that the property should
not be annexed until certain modifications had been
made to the property. ( R. 30)
2. The modifications which the City Council indi-

cated were necessary to bring the property up to a stand·
ard which would make it suitable for annexation to the
City of Beaver included the installation of water lines
through the property in question, and the preparation
for the paving of certain portions of the property, prefa·

2

the dedication of such property as a street, if the
,t 11 ncxation were to occur.
30)
1,1r>·

to

;). The Plaintiffs in this case then filed suit seeking
to enjoin annexation of the property an<l alleging three
counts: ( 1) \' iolation by the City Council of Section 10:i-l, C tah Code Annotated; ( 2) Unlawful reversal of an11ourn·ed public policy by the City Council; and (3)
Almse of discretion by the City Council. ( R. 4<-11)
·1. Upon the filing of Motions for Summary J udg-

ment by the Defendants, together with Supporting AffirlaYits, and upon an Affidavit in Contravention filed by
the Plaintiffs, the Trial Court found that even if the
Plaintiffs were able to prove the factual allegations of
their complaint, they would not be entitled to judgment
as a matter of law and that Defendants' l\Iotions for
Summary Judgment should be granted. (R. T. 4)

ARGUl\IENT
POINT I.
SCl\11\LARY JUDGl\IENT IS PROPER 'VHEN
THERE IS NO
ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT, TI-IE DETER1\ IINATION OF
\\'HICH IS NECESSARY TO SETTLE THE
HlGTITS OF THE PARTIES.
1

Rule 50 ( c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
'-'·
forth the grounds upon which summary judgment
:- ha 1l he granted:

3

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. [Emphasis added.]
The U tab Supreme Court has given this Rule effect
and has affirmed summary judgments in numerous
recent cases. See, e.g., Trunsamcrican Title Ins. Co. v.
United Resources, Inc., 24 U.2d 346, 47I P.2d 165
(I970); Summerhays v. Holm, 24 U.2d I90, 468 P.2d
366 ( I970) ; Middleton v. Co,r, 24 U.2d 43, 465 P.2d
530 ( I970); Robinson v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 22 U.2d I63, 450 P.2d 9I ( I969) ;Pioneer
Finance Thrift Co. v. Powell, 2I U.2d 20I, 443 P.2d
389 ( I968) ; Christensen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2I U.2d
I94, 443 P.2d 385 ( I968); Foster v. Steed, I9 U.2d 435,
432 P.2d 60 ( I967); Menlove v. Salt Lake County, 18
U .2d 203, 4 I 8 P .2d 227 (I 966) ; Pioneer Savings
LoanAss'n. v. Pioneer Finance
Thrift Co., I8 U.2d
106, 417 P.2d I2I (I966); Allen's Products Co. v.
Glover, I8 U.2d 9, 4I4 P.2d 93 (I966); Leininger v.
Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., I7 U.2d 37, 404 P.2d 33
(1965); Nat'l. American Life Ins. Co. v. Bayou Country Club, I6 U.2d 4I 7, 403 P.2d 26 ( I965); AmuncUon
Accident Ass'n., I3 U.2d
v. Mutual Benefit Health
407, 37 5 P .2d 463 (I 962); Henry v. W ashiki Club Inc.,
11 U.2d I38, 355 P.2d 973 (I960); Brandt v. Sprin,qville Banking Co., IO U.2d 350, 353 P.2d 460 (I960);
Dupler v. Yates, IO U .2d 25I, 35I P.2d 624 ( I960);

4

,Lct11a Loan Co. v.
Deposit Co. of Maryland,
\I l' .2J H:l, 346 P.2d 1078 ( 1959); Richards v. Anderson, 9 C.2d 17, 337 P.2d 59 ( 1959); Abdulkadir v.
Western Pacific R.R. Co., 7 U.2d 53, 318 P.2d 339
\ Hl57); Young v. Felornia, 121 U. 646, 244 P.2d 862
11952) . And in doing so the court has formulated the
kst of what constitutes a material fact. For example, in
'I'r11nrnmerica 'Title Ins. Co. v. United Resources,
Inc'., supra., the Court considered an appeal from a summary judgment according full faith and credit to an Ariz;ona judgment in favor of Plaintiff. In the case, the Defendant asserted as a defense that the Arizona Court did
not have jurisdiction to enter judgment. On appeal, the
Defendant asserted that such defense raised an issue of
fad upon which the Defendant should have been allowed to present evidence. Speaking for a unanimous
court, Crockett, J ., said:

It is thus clear from this Rule [ 56 ( c) ] that
when upon the basis of the pleadings, depositions,
answers * * *, admissions and affidavits . . .
a party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law, the motion for summary judgment should
be granted. But if it appears ... that there is a
dispute as to any issue of fact which would be
determinative of the rights of the parties, it
should be denied .... The purpose of the discovery and of the summary judgment procedures ...
is to furnish a method for searching out and fadlitating the resolution of issues which are not in
dispute, and of settling the rights of the
without the time, trouble and expense of a trial.
[Emphasis added; citations omitted. J 24 U.2d
at 348.
5

The Court concluded that summary judgment was
properly granted by the trial court as the Defendant's
challenge to the foreign courts jurisdiction, when viewed
with the pleadings and other submissions, amounted only
to an attempt to challenge jurisdiction as a matter of law.
And in Dupler v. Yates, supra., the Court said:
The primary purpose of the summary j udgment procedure is to pierce the allegations of tht
pleadings, show that there i,s no genuine issue of
material fact, although an i,ssue ·may be raised by
the pleadings, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [Emphasis
added.) 10 U.2d at 269.
These are but examples of the cases where the Utah
Supreme Court has properly recognized that the determinative factor is the existence of issues of material fact,
not as appellant here suggests, the existence of any issue
of fact. Other Utah cases recognizing the importance of
examining the factual issues for materiality include:
Summerhays v. Holm, supra; Middleton v. Cox, supra.;
Robinson v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp.,
supra.; Pioneer
Thrift Co. v. Powell, supra.;
Christensen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., supra.; Foster v.
Steed, supra.; Menlove v. Salt Lake County, supra.;
Leininger v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., supra.; Aetna
Loan Co. v.
Deposit Co. of Maryland, supra.;
Young v. Felornia, supra.
In applying the test that an issue of fact is material
only if it is determinative of the rights of the parties, the
Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there are

6

no material issues of fact and that cases should be decided according to applicable law, if under the most fa1 <lntble view of the Plaintiff's facts, he could not prevail
as a matter of hw. Pioneer Finance
'l'hrift Co. v.
J'owcll, supra.; Pioneer Savinys Loan Ass'n. v. Pio11ca Finance & 'l'hrift Co., supra.; Allen's Products Co.
L'. Glover, supra.; Aniundson v. Mutual Benefit Health
:\ccident Ass'n., supra.; llenry v. JVashiki Club Inc.,
supra.; Brandt v. Springville Banking Co., supra.;
Dupler v. Yates, supra.; Richards v. Anderson, supra.;
A/)(Lulkadir v. IVestern Pacific R.R. Co., supra.
The principles, that an issue of fact is material only if
it is determinative of the rights of the parties and that
summary judgment for the Defendant is proper when
under the most favorable view of the Plaintiff's case he
would as a matter of law, not be entitled to judgment,
correctly reflect the purpose behind Rule 56 ( c), that Defendants should not be put to the time, trouble and expense of unmeritorious litigation. 'l'ransamerica 'l'itlc
Ins. Co. v. United Resources, Inc., supra; Pioneer SavLoan Ass'n. v. Pioneer
Thrift Co., supra.; Allen's Product Co. v. Glover, supra.; Nat'l.
Anierican Life Ins. Co. v. Bayou Country Club, supra.;
Henry v. JVashiki Club Inc., supra.; Brandt v. Spring1'illc Banking Co., supra; Dupler v. Yates, supra.; Aetna
Loan Co. v.
Deposit Co. of Mar.1Jland, supra.;
Richards v. Anderson, supra.; Abdulkadir v. Western
Pacific ll .R. Co., supra.; and see Leininger v. Stearn.<;Hor;cr 1llfg. Co., supra.
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The trial judge properly had these principles of law
in mind when in granting Respondents' motions for sum.
mary judgment he declared:
The court finds that even if the facts set forth
in the first cause of action were determined to
be true that it would be outside the scope of this
court to make a ruling or determination on matters that are within the discretion of the legislative authorities and mayor of Beaver City. The
court finds that the second and third cause of
action in substance stand in a major portion upon
the first cause of action, that falling and failing
the motion for summary judgment as to the second and third cause of action is granted also.
(R. T. 4)
POINT II.
THE APPELLANT HAS NO LEGAL BASIS
FOR RELIEF.
The Plaintiff below proceeded on three theories:
( 1) That the City of Beaver unconstitutionally and in
violation of Section 10-3-1 Utah Code Annotated
( 1962) delegated and prescribed a condition precedent
to annexation; ( 2) That the City of Beaver improperly
altered its announced public policy; and ( 3) That the
possible or proposed annexation is without legal justification.

A. The City of Beaver properly exercised its legislative power.

The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly recog-

8

nizcJ that the fixing of the boundaries of a city is a legislative function.Jn re 1'own of West Jordan, 7 U.2d 391,
;l:W P.2d 105 ( 1958); Application uf Peterson, 92
C.212, 66 P.2d 1195 (1937); Plutus Min. Co. v. Orme,
76 U .286, 289 P .132 ( 1930). This power has been properly delegated by the legislature. Utah Code Ann. §10:3-1 (1962); Utah Code Ann. §10-4-1 (1962). The
power which the legislature has delegated is divided into
two parts: ( 1) The power to annex pursuant to Section
10-3-1, and (2) The power to serve pursuant to Sections 10-4-1 to 10-4-5.
In dealing with the delegation posed by the latter,
Sections 10-4-1 to 10-4-5, which give to the property
owners and the district courts power to effectuate a severance of territory from the corporate limits of a municipality, the court has recognized that the delegation
should be strictly construed as to the power which it
places in the judiciary. The reasons underlying this recognition are founded in the separation of powers created
by Art. V, §1 of the Utah Constitution. Thus the court
recognizes that the role of the court is one of adjudicator
and that the role which it may play in the legislative function of boundary determination is one of fact-finder, not
policy maker. In re Town of West Jordan, h'Upra; Plutus
Jfin. Co. v. Orme, supra; Young v. Smt Lake City, 24
U. 321, 67 P. 1066 ( 1902) . The court also recognizes in
these cases the legislative determination that the legislature cannot sit in judgment of every boundary dispute
and the determination that some other body who is closer
to the people and to the fact questions involved should

9

The trial judge properly had these principles of law
in mind when in granting Respondents' motions for summary judgment he declared:
The court finds that even if the facts set forth
in the first cause of action were determined to
be true that it would be outside the scope of this
court to make a ruling or determination on matters that are within the discretion of the legislative authorities and mayor of Beaver City. The
court finds that the second and third cause of
action in substance stand in a major portion upon
the first cause of action, that falling and failing
the motion for summary judgment as to the second and third cause of action is granted also.
(R. T. 4)
POINT II.
THE APPELLANT HAS NO LEGAL BASIS
FOR RELIEF.
The Plaintiff below proceeded on three theories:
( 1) That the City of Beaver unconstitutionally and in
violation of Section 10-3-1 Utah Code Annotated
( 1962) delegated and prescribed a condition precedent
to annexation; ( 2) That the City of Beaver improperly
altered its announced public policy; and ( 3) That the
possible or proposed annexation is without legal justification.

A. The City of Beaver properly exercised its legislative power.

The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly recog·
8

nized that the fixing of the boundaries of a city is a legislatiYe function.Jn re Town of West Jordan, 7 U.2d 391,
;l26 P.2d 105 ( 1958); Application of Peterson, 92
c.212, 60 P.2d 1195 ( 1937) ; Plutus Min. Co. v. Orme,
76 U.286,
P.132 (1930). This power has been properly delegated by the legislature. Utah Code Ann. §103-1 (1962); Utah Code Ann. §10-4-1 (1962). The
power which the legislature has delegated is divided into
two parts: ( 1) The power to annex pursuant to Section
10-3-1, and (2) The power to serve pursuant to Sections 10-4-1 to 10-4-5.
In dealing with the delegation posed by the latter,
Sections 10-4-1 to 10-4-5, which give to the property
owners and the district courts power to effectuate a severance of territory from the corporate limits of a municipality, the court has recognized that the delegation
should be strictly construed as to the power which it
places in the judiciary. The reasons underlying this recognition are founded in the separation of powers created
by Art. V, §1 of the Utah Constitution. Thus the court
recognizes that the role of the court is one of adjudicator
and that the role which it may play in the legi_slative function of boundary determination is one of fact-finder, not
policy maker. Jn re Town of West Jordan, supra; Plutus
Min. Co. v. Orme, supra; Young v. Salt Lake City, 24
U. 321, 67 P. 1066 (1902). The court also recognizes in
these cases the legislative determination that the legislature cannot sit in judgment of every boundary dispute
:md the determination that some other body who is closer
to the people and to the fact questions involved should
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determine the question of severance. Thus, Sections lo.
4-1 to 10-4-5 which provide for severence upon petition
of the district courts by property owners in the territory
sought to be severed and upon a proper determination b;,
the court that requisite facts exist, has been strictly construed by the Utah Supreme Court, limiting the district
courts to judicial functions, while at the same time effectuating the legislative determination that severance
should be judged on a local level.
Section 10-3-1, however, provides a different procedure for annexation. The statute places power in the
governing bodies of the municipalities to effectuate annexation at their discretion, upon the petition of the owners of property living within the territory sought to be
annexed. The separation of powers problem does not
exist under this procedure. The governing bodies, in this
case the city council, are legislative bodies. Utah Code
Ann. 10-6-5 ( 1962) . As legislative bodies they are
charged by Section 10-3-1 with the duty of exercising
the legislature's power to fix municipal boundaries.
Again, we have the legislatiYe determination that a gov·
ernmental instrumentality which is closer to the people
and to the facts of each individual situation shall deter·
mine questions of the boundaries of municipalities. But,
in this case, absent the separation of powers problem,
the statute should be liberally construed to effectuate its
purpose, State v. Jones, 17 U.2d 190, 407 P.2d 571
( 1965) ; Andrus v. Allred, 17 U.2d 106, 404 P.2d 972
(1965); Sjostrom v. Bishop, 15 U.2d 373, 393 P.2d 472
( 1964) ; Peay v. Bd. of Ed. of Provo City School Dist.,
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14 C.2d 63, 377 P.2d 490 (1962); Ringwood v. State,
8 U.:.>.d 287, 333 P.2d 943 (1959), even though, of
course, the doctrine of separation of powers limits the
scope of review by the judiciary. This is not to ask the
court to abrogate the fixed requirements for annexation
which the delegation imposes, but it must be recognized
that the legislature has by its delegation sought to pass
the burden of determining the boundaries of cities within
the state to the cities and to the people owning property
adjacent to the cities. To accomplish this purpose, the
statute places the power to initiate formal annexation
proceedings in the owners of property adjacent to the
city. The city council, however, is the depository of absolute discretion whether annexation shall be finally effected or not.
The city council in this case recognized the statutory
scheme for annexation. It has also recognized that the
formal annexation procedures should not be empty procedures. It is allowed by the statute to refuse to annex
without giving reasons. It would be allowed to refuse to
annex the property in dispute, if it felt that the property
should meet certain standards before being joined to the
City of Beaver. The city council's judgment was that the
property did not meet the standards which in its sound
discretion would make the property suitable for annexation. To avoid a petition for annexation being reduced
lo an empty gesture, the city council resolved that the
property in question should meet certain standards. We
may, here, point out, as an aside, that the Plaintiffs in
this case, as taxpayers and residents of the City, are com-
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plaining that the City indicated a desire not to annex
property until it was upgraded-a curious complaint,
which may be viewed as against the taxpayers' interest.
In this case the City acted to give meaning to the
statutory procedure, to effectuate its purpose, and to
prevent a wasted effort by hopeful property owners who
had announced an intention to seek annexation. To invalidate the cities action in this case would be to establish
the principle that the only way in which cities can make
their will known in respect to standards which must be
met in order for annexation to take place is to consider
and reject a proper petition for annexation. The effect
of such principle would be that any time property owners
seek annexation, they must first petition the city to
which they desire to be annexed, hear the city's judgment
concerning their petition, any reasons why the annexation is refused, and what the city deems requisite of prop·
erty to be annexed. Such property owners must then de·
termine whether they desire to meet the standards of the
city imposes, make the necessary alterations in their
property, and again petition the city. Certainly the stat·
ute cannot be deemed to require this. Certainly the stat·
ute is not so narrow that the cities in Utah cannot speak
to annexation without a proper petitioner before them.
The city council's lawful action seeking to clarify
its standard and seeking to render the annexation pro·
cedure meaningful, cannot be viewed as a delegation of
power. A delegation of power is a surrender or grant of
power or control over some subject matter which is
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properly within the city's power. Acts which have removed far more power and control than is removed in
the instant case, under any view of the facts, have not
been viewed as delegations by the Utah Supreme Court.
See Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 119 U.274, 226 P.2d
127 (1950); Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 U.237, 48 P.2d
5130 ( 1935). The City of Beaver surrendered, in fact or
law, no power and no control. It indicated its judgment
of the proper standards which property should meet in
applying for annexation. It is within the legislative
power of a legislative or deliberative body to withdraw,
reverse, or re-examine any legislative judgment, although the limits of due process may prohibit disturbing
any vested rights in doing so. See e.g., Crawford v. Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 59 So. 963 (1912). Any promise which
can be construed from the City Council's announcement
certainly cannot be construed as running to the Plaintiffs in this case. If the Defendant property owners had
acted in reliance upon an asserted promise, perhaps, they
could complain. But, they are not here for that purpose,
and the Plainiffs cannot assert that there has been any
promise to them which has caused them to act or forbear
to their detriment.

unicipalities have the right to reconsider actions taken.

B.

Section 10-7-1 of the Utah Code Annotated prori<les that cities and towns shall be bodies politic. "Body
politic" has been defined as a term particularly appropriate to a public corporation invested with powers and
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duties of govermnent. Jlll unn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113,
124, 24 L.Ed. 77 ( 1876). The Utah Code does not stop
here, however. Section 10-6-5 provides "the :Mayor and
city council in cities of the third class [the City of
Beaver J ... are and shall be the legislative and govern.
ing bodies of such cities ... " (parenthetical expression
added). The appellants assert that it is not within the
power of the city council of the City of Beaver to announce a public policy and subsequently abandon it in
favor of another policy. In their affidavits supporting
the city's motion for summary judgment, the individual
members of the city council controverted the assertion
that there had been the announcement alleged by the
plaintiffs. ( R. 30) It may now be said that whether there
had been an announced public policy and a subsequent
reversal thereof is now a fact in issue. Examination, however, of the power of the city council of the City of
Beaver, as the legislative and governing body of a body
politic, discloses that particular issue of fact to be totally
irrelevant to the dispute before the court.
The Utah Supreme Court has not had occasion to
consider whether it is within the power of a municipality
to reconsider actions it has taken. That issue, however.
has been often litigated in other jurisdictions. City of
Harvey v. Getz, 118 F.2d 817 (7th Cir.) cert. den. 314
U.S. 628, 86 L.Ed. 504, 62 S.Ct. 59 ( 1941); See Ed·
wards Realty
Finance Co. v. City of Superior, 250
'Vis. 472, 27 N.,V'.2d 370; Dal Maso v. Bd. of Comm'rs
of Prince George's County, 182 J\fd. 200, 34 A.2d 464
(1943); Cowlitz County v. Johnson, 2 'Vash. 2d 497, 98
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p,zd 644 ( 1940). The rule which has emerged is that a
municipality may reconsider its actions, repeal its ordinances, and reverse its announcements any time until
the rights of third parties have vested. The words of the
Supreme Court of Florida, in Crawford v. Gilchrist,
supra, well state the rationale which the courts employ:
'A right to reconsider action is an attribute of all deliberative bodies." [Emphasis added.] 50 So. at 968. Of
course, the exception made for those situations in which
third parties have vested rights is that imposed by various constitutional limitations upon the taking of property without just compensation and due process of law.
That exception, it is plain, does not apply here. The
plaintiffs claim no vested rights, no money damages, and
no specific acts of reliance. Nor could they assert such
a claim, as they themselves characterize the city council's
action as an announcement of public policy. Yet they ask
the court to declare a simple change of legislative intent
-of public policy-to be a violation of the cities discretion and a prohibited act. It requires no authority to see
the consequences of the rule they seek. If the municipalities of this state cannot change a simple announcement
of public policy, how could we find it within their power
to repeal or amend an ordinance. If a city may not
change its policy, how can we say it may change its laws.
This clearly cannot be the rule.
C. A nne.:t'ation of the property in question by the
City of Beaver would be legally justified.
The plaintiff asserted that the city has no legal justification upon which to found a decision to annex. They
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alleged that anm'x:1til)ll would be unreasonable and with.
uut legal justification. Yiewed most fai;orably to tht
plaintiff. it appears that all the third cause of action <hserts is that the decision l)f the City of Bea,·er, if it ha\
made lHll'. is wrong. The trial court recognized this a1.
scrtiun for what it is when it said:
The L'l1urt finds that the action of the cifr coun.
eil and the mayl)r l)f Be:n-er City. "·hile this cour:
may nr may iwt agree with what was done, it is
within their d:scretiLm to do and to take that
al'til1ll. DL1 yl1u want some time to
1 R. T.
4)
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thorities which would justify a judicial alteration
or extension of the boundaries of the wne . ...
The factual allegations of plaintiff's complaint do
not support the conclusions drawn by the plaintiff therefrom and stated in such pleading. The
judgment of the lower court, therefore, was correct. '255 P .2d at 724.
EYen though the plaintiff's complaint was insufficient, it may be of some guidance to examine the reasonableness of the city's action. Owners of property adjacent to the city sought to devote their property to commercial use by selling it to a commercial enterprise. The
city council recognized the property owners' desire, in
conjunction with their developmental plans, to be annexed to the City of Beaver. Certainly it was reasonable
for the City of Beaver to recognize the advantage of
adding commercial property situated adjacent to the
city, to its corporate territory. Its interest may be founded both in increasing its tax base and in extending its
regulatory power to commercial indeavors which are
bound to have an effect upon the commerce of the city
and upon its health, safety, and welfare. Dowse v. Salt
Lake City, Corp., supra. Yet, the plaintiff glibly asserts
that the city has abused its discretion.

POINT Ill.
THE PLAIXTIFF POSES A SERIOUS CHALLEXGE TO THE PO,VER GRANTED TO )lFXIC IP ALITIES UY THE UTAH LEGISLATl'RE.
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Throughout this brief we have pointed out the insufficiency of the plaintiff's allegations in the court be.
low. The plaintiff here attempts to divert the court's attention by pointing to issues of fact, even though there
are no material issues of fact. The plaintiff has in no
way, throughout this litigation, addressed himself to the
issue of materiality. Plaintiff simply asks the court to
order the City of Beaver to engage in extended litigation
because plaintiff is able to isolate immaterial issues of
fact. The plaintiff may be asked, what becomes of the
power to act for the benefit of their citizens which the
legislature has delegated to municipalities throughout
Title 10 of the Utah Code, if plaintiff or any other irritated citizen is able to come into court, assert an immaterial issue of fact, demand a trial, and receive a trial, regardless of the merits of his claim? Respondent has no
doubt what the result would be. Our city and town goYernments would be hamstrung. Municipal government
in the State of Utah would screech to a halt. It is ironic
that plaintiff asserts this rule of law as proper after being offered time to amend by the trial court and after de·
dining to amend. The duty of the court is to uphold the
powers of government unless there has been a plain and
manifest abuse. Lehi City v. Meiling, supra. Rule 56(c)
provides summary judgment procedures to aid the court
in its task. Menlove v. Salt Lake City, supra. If Rule
56 ( c) were ever applicable, it is now.
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CONCLUSION
Rule 50 ( c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures
and the cases decided under it indicate that where the
plaintiff fails to present a claim under which he could
prevail summary judgment is proper. This is such a case.
The City Council of the City of Beaver has reasonably
acted within its power. The only rule under which plaintiff would be entitled to prevail is one which would, without basis in law, seriously cripple municipal government
throughout Utah and which would take all meaning
from Rule 56 ( c). The District Court's summary judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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